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Abstract
In this article, we review the most important findings to have emerged during the past ten
years in the study of judgment and decision making (JDM) in adolescence and look ahead
to possible new directions in this burgeoning area of research. Three interrelated shifts in
research emphasis are of particular importance, and serve to organize this review. First,
research grounded in normative models of JDM has moved beyond the study of age
differences in risk perception and toward a dynamic account of the factors predicting
adolescent decisions. Second, the field has seen widespread adoption of dual-process
models of cognitive development that describe two relatively independent modes of
information processing, typically contrasting an analytic (“cold”) system with an
experiential (“hot”) one. Finally, there has been an increase in attention to the social,
emotional, and self-regulatory factors that influence JDM. This shift in focus reflects the
growing influence of findings from developmental neuroscience, which describe a pattern
of structural and functional maturation that may set the stage for a heightened propensity
to make risky decisions in adolescence.
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Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence
Imagine, for a moment, that you are sixteen years old.

It is the spring of your

sophomore year of high school, and you feel a newfound sense of optimism about your
social prospects. Best of all, it’s Friday night and you are ready to take advantage of your
recently renegotiated curfew, now extended to 11 p.m. When pressed for your plans, you
tell your parents that you’re just going to the movies and then maybe hanging out at the
coffee shop: No need to worry. In reality, you know that when your friends pick you up,
you will head straight to the first big keg party to which you’ve ever been invited.
Everyone will be there. But you’ll have to be careful, because these things get busted by
the cops all the time, not to mention the fact that your parents will be waiting up for you
when you get home. You aren’t really planning on drinking at the party, but if you do,
you’ll definitely need some breath mints and a believable horror movie synopsis. That
should be easy enough.
We begin our review with this exercise in creative visualization not to inspire fear
and suspicion in those among our readers charged with parenting a teenager, but to
illustrate the multitude of factors that dynamically shape adolescents’ choices. On this
one weekend evening, our hypothetical teenager will make a series of choices with
potentially lasting consequences for his health, safety, criminal record, family
relationships, and social status. These decisions are likely to be influenced not only by
his capacity to accurately evaluate the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of
action, but also the social and emotional contexts in which he makes the decisions – the
mix of excitement and anxiety he brings to the party, his in-the-moment assessment of
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social expectations, and his background fear of getting caught by police or parents, to
name just a few. Stated simply, adolescent decision making is a complex and multiply
determined phenomenon.
Fortunately, the last decade of scholarship on adolescent judgment and decision
making (JDM) has seen remarkable progress in modeling this complexity. Building on
normative models of rational decision making, the field has dramatically expanded its
explanatory power by integrating research methods and theoretical insights from
cognitive, developmental, social, and emotion perspectives, with a growing influence
from the neurosciences. Indeed, this movement toward an interdisciplinary perspective
has made it increasingly difficult to define the boundaries of adolescent JDM as a topic of
investigation. After all, what domain of adolescent behavior does not involve some
degree of judgment or decision making? Because space limitations preclude an
exhaustive consideration of such an expansively defined literature, our review is
necessary selective, guided by our assessment of the most important developments over
the last decade within the traditional domains of interest to adolescent JDM researchers.
Responding to public policy concerns regarding adolescents’ relative competence to
make decisions with long-term consequences for their health and well being, the field has
historically focused on identifying domains of immaturity in adolescent decision making.
Although our review reflects this tradition, we emphasize that many, if not most,
adolescents demonstrate remarkable decision-making competence across a variety of
domains. Future research on adolescent JDM should aspire to integrate current models
focused on adolescent immaturity with the growing literature documenting the biological,
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psychological, and contextual factors promoting positive youth development (Lerner,
2009).
Three inter-related developments in adolescent JDM research serve to organize
this review. First, developmental research grounded in normative models of rational
decision making has made significant gains in identifying the factors that influence
adolescents’ choices. Building on foundational work modeling the key components of
rational decision making, early research in this tradition focused on identifying aspects of
cognitive processing in which adolescents were deficient relative to adults, particularly
with regard to decisions involving risk. In response to considerable evidence that
adolescents evaluate risky decisions in a manner similar to adults (Reyna & Farley,
2006), research from the past decade has shifted from an examination of age differences
in risk processing toward comprehensive modeling of the factors predicting adolescents’
decisions. Such models have gained considerable explanatory power by examining the
interplay of both risk and benefit perceptions, as well as the role of experience in
modifying these views.
Second, following theoretical developments in the adult JDM literature (and
related trends in cognitive and social psychology), the field has seen widespread adoption
of dual-process models of cognitive development (see Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2005, for
multiple examples). These models describe two relatively independent modes of
information processing, typically contrasting an analytic (deliberative, controlled,
reasoned, “cold”) system with an experiential (intuitive, automatic, reactive, “hot”)
system (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Gerrard, Gibbons, Houlihan, Stock, & Pomery, 2008; Jacobs
& Klaczynski, 2002; Reyna & Farley, 2006). Proponents of dual-process models argue
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that traditional cognitive development research has been limited by its singular focus on
the analytic system, leading to theories of unidirectional maturational trajectories
proceeding from intuitive to reasoned processing (Klaczynski, 2005). Given evidence
that the use of many heuristics actually increases in adulthood, dual-process proponents
argue that developmental models of JDM must account for the distinct maturational
trajectories of analytic and experiential systems. In this view, changes in JDM over the
course of adolescence do not reflect a simple transition from experiential to analytic
processing, but rather result from domain-specific shifts in the relative dominance of
intuition and reason.
The influence of dual-process theories can also be felt in a third research trend, a
growth in attention to the social, emotional, and self-regulatory factors that influence
adolescents’ JDM. This shift in focus reflects the growing influence of findings from
developmental neuroscience, which describe a pattern of structural and functional
maturation that may set the stage for a heightened propensity to make risky decisions in
adolescence. Social and emotional factors relevant to adolescent JDM include normative
changes in core motivational processes, such as sensation seeking and sensitivity to
reward and punishment, as well as age-related changes in the relative influence of
contextual variables (e.g., the presence or absence of peers) on risk-taking behavior.
Together, evidence for heightened sensitivity to social and emotional factors in early-tomiddle adolescence has offered one plausible account for the corresponding prevalence
of risk taking. Complementary to this focus on social and emotional factors, research has
also described continued development in late adolescence of capacities supporting growth
in self-regulatory competence, which is thought to contribute to a corresponding decline
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in risk taking. Consistent with the dual-process perspectives described above, this
research has sought to push the field beyond the study of “cold” cognition and toward
explication of the experiential factors that influence real-world, in-the-moment decision
making.
Beyond Risk Perception: Expanding the Study of Rational Decision Making
Prior to the mid-1990s, research on adolescent JDM focused largely on whether
adolescents employed adult-like cognitive processes when making decisions (for reviews,
see Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Davis, 1993). Much of this
work stemmed from concerns about the high prevalence of risk behavior among
adolescents (especially compared to adults) and the consequences of risk taking for
adolescents’ health. As a general rule, adolescents are more likely than adults over 25 to
binge drink, smoke cigarettes, have casual sex partners, engage in violent and other
criminal behavior, and have fatal or serious automobile crashes, the majority of which are
caused by reckless driving or driving under the influence of alcohol. Because many of
these behaviors appear inherently irrational when individuals understand their probable
long-term consequences, it was assumed that adolescents must be less competent than
adults in one or more of the elements of rational decision making.
Normative models of JDM have historically emphasized five broad stages
supporting competent decision making, including: (a) identifying options; (b) assessing
the possible consequences of each option; (c) evaluating the desirability of each
consequence; (d) estimating the probability of occurrence for each consequence; and (e)
applying a decision algorithm to the above information to identify the option with the
greatest subjective utility (Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman,
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2001). Drawing upon these and similar models (e.g., Theory of Planned Behavior;
Azjen, 1985), a great deal of research searched for the source of adolescents’ heightened
propensity to make risky choices by comparing adolescent and adult performance within
specific stages of the decision-making process. Specifically, much of this work examined
whether adolescents perceive the potential consequences of risk behavior (i.e., Stage b)
and accurately assess the probability of those consequences occurring (i.e., Stage d) to the
same degree as adults.
Contradicting popular conceptions of the typical adolescent as beset by an
“invulnerability complex,” adolescents were shown to be no worse than adults at
perceiving risk or estimating their vulnerability to it, and studies found that increasing the
salience of the risks associated with making a poor or potentially dangerous decision has
comparable effects on adolescents and adults (for a discussion of false leads in the study
of adolescent risk taking, see Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002; Reyna & Farley, 2006;
Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996; Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008). Indeed, there appear to be
few, if any, age differences in individuals’ evaluations of the risks inherent in a wide
range of dangerous behaviors (e.g., driving while drunk, having unprotected sex) or in
their judgments about the seriousness of the consequences that might result from risky
behavior (Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; although, see Cohn et al., 1995, for an exception
where adolescents judge lower risk than adults for “occasional” engagement in risk
behavior).
Given evidence that adolescents do not differ much from adults in their capacity
to rationally evaluate risk information, researchers have begun to look for other
explanations of why adolescents, as a group, make riskier decisions than adults. As we
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will describe in later sections, this shift has led to expanded consideration of social,
emotional, and self-regulatory factors differentiating adolescent from adult decision
making. At the same time, research grounded in rational decision theory has made
considerable progress in building models describing the cognitive factors that predict
adolescents’ health risk decisions.
Prior to the last decade, the field’s reliance on cross-sectional self-report studies
produced a puzzling set of findings regarding the relation between risk perceptions and
behaviors (for reviews, see Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
Given the assumption that adolescents rationally evaluate costs and benefits to reach a
decision, cognitive models typically predict that individuals who perceive lower risk will
be more likely to engage in a given behavior. Although many studies have reported this
expected negative correlation between risk perception and behavior (e.g., Benthin,
Slovic, & Severson, 1993; Hemmelstein, 1995), others have found the opposite – that
adolescents engaging in risk behavior perceive higher risks than do non-engagers (e.g.,
Cohn, Macfarlane, Yanez, & Imai, 1995; Gerrard, Gibbons, & Bushman, 1996). To a
degree, these contradictory findings can be accounted for by differences between studies
with respect to the conditionality of risk perception assessments (Ronis, 1992). When risk
perceptions are assessed unconditionally (i.e., “How likely are you to experience negative
consequences from smoking?”), risk-takers accurately report a higher degree of personal
risk than their peers who are not engaging in risk behavior. In contrast, when presented
with conditional questions (i.e., “If you smoked, how likely are consequences?”), risktakers tend to report lower risk perceptions than their risk-abstaining counterparts.
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Such findings highlight both the role of experience as a modifier of risk
perceptions and the need for longitudinal studies that assess risk perceptions before
individuals engage in risk behavior. Although careful longitudinal research investigating
prospective predictors of health risk behavior is still much needed for a variety of
domains, the last decade has seen progress in at least one area. Specifically, a number of
longitudinal studies examining precursors of smoking initiation have provided strong
evidence that adolescents who perceive a lower probability of harmful consequences are
more likely to initiate smoking (Krosnick, Chang, Sherman, Chassin, & Presson, 2006;
Rodriguez, Romer & Audrain-McGovern; Song et al., 2009; Song, Glantz, & HalpernFelsher, in press). These studies provide an important reminder that, despite the inability
to explain age differences in risk behavior, risk perception remains a valuable
explanatory construct and a viable target for prevention efforts.
Recent research also has made progress in explicating the role of experience in
modifying risk perceptions. As we discussed above, when adolescents are asked how
dangerous an activity would be if they were to engage in it, individuals experienced in the
behavior consistently report lower risk perceptions than do those without experience.
Although this finding can be explained in part by a presumed causal pathway from low
risk perception to subsequent risk engagement, it is also possible that experience with risk
behavior causes individuals to adjust their risk judgments downward. This explanation is
particularly plausible given the low frequency or long-term nature of negative
consequences associated with many risk behaviors (e.g., lung cancer from smoking,
infectious disease from unprotected sexual activity, motor vehicle crashes resulting from
drunk driving). Although adolescents may initially adopt the high risk estimates for these
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behaviors provided in health education classes, direct experiences with the behavior in
the absence of serious negative consequences could create a downward shift in risk
perception. Indeed, longitudinal research indicates that failing to experience a negative
outcome is associated with decreased risk perceptions for alcohol use (Goldberg,
Halpern-Felsher, & Millstein, 2002), drug use (Katz, Fromme, & D’Amico, 2000),
drinking and driving (Nygaard, Waiters, Grube, & Keefe, 2003), and sexual activity
(Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002). These findings raise the concern that preventive
efforts focused on bolstering adolescents’ perceptions of health risks could backfire by
leading those adolescents with “successful” risk-taking experiences to radically discount
the validity of the health information message, thereby increasing their propensity to
engage in further risk behavior. If the Partnership for a Drug Free America claims that
smoking marijuana will transform your brain into a fried egg, and you nonetheless share
a joint with friends on occasion and manage to maintain your GPA, then why trust what
they say about cocaine and heroin?
Finally, much of the improvement in predicting adolescents’ decision making has
derived from an expanded consideration of the subjective benefits that adolescents
associate with health risk behaviors. For instance, one study found that adolescents’
perceptions of the benefits (e.g., social status, pleasure) of alcohol and tobacco use
prospectively predicts their decisions to drink and smoke six months later, above and
beyond age, experience with the substance, and perceptions of risk (Goldberg et al.,
2002; see also Halpern-Felsher, Biehl, Kropp, & Rubinstein, 2004; Meier, Slutke, Arndt,
& Cadoret, 2007; Song et al., 2009). A recent meta-analysis of studies predicting sexual
activity, alcohol and tobacco use, and nutrition behavior in adolescents ages 10-18 found
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that perceptions of benefits are stronger predictors than risk perceptions of all four
behaviors (Peters et al., 2009). By considering the benefits that adolescents’ derive from
engaging in risk behavior, the field is approaching a much richer understanding of the
subjective factors that shape adolescents’ decisions (Michels, Kropp, Eyre, & HalpernFelsher, 2005).
Dual-Process Models of Cognitive Development
Despite these improvements in modeling individual differences in adolescent
health risk behavior, many scholars have remained unsatisfied with the failure of rational
decision theories to adequately describe what develops in adolescent JDM (e.g., Jacobs &
Klaczynski, 2002; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2003). As we noted above, most
research on adolescent decision making conducted prior to the mid-1990’s sought to
identify gains in decision processing skills, largely based on the assumption that
competence developed along a unidirectional, linear trajectory progressing from
childhood intuition to mature, deliberative thinking in adulthood (Jacobs & Klaczynski,
2002). Investigators concerned with adolescent JDM have raised two strong challenges
to this theoretical framework. First, the claim that decision processing develops over the
course of childhood and adolescence toward an end state of rational, deliberate decision
making is inconsistent with a wealth of evidence from the adult JDM literature that adult
decision making is riddled with cognitive biases and heuristics (see Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1982). Indeed, as we will describe below, developmental studies suggest that
certain heuristics and biases become more prevalent over the course of childhood and
adolescence (Reyna & Farley, 2006). In essence, if the road of normative development
leads to logically rigorous decision making, most adults fail to reach the destination.
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Second, given that few gains in logical reasoning or information processing are apparent
after mid-adolescence (Kuhn, 2009), the development of rational competence cannot
explain the many age differences observed between adolescents and adults in real-world
decision making, particularly adolescents’ heightened risk-taking behavior (Gerrard et al.,
2008; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2008). We discuss evidence for each of these
critiques in turn, and describe a class of dual process models that have been advanced to
account for the seemingly paradoxical nature of adolescent cognitive development.
The Development of Heuristic Processing
A large body of research on adult judgment and decision making has
demonstrated that although adults behave in accord with logical processing expectations
on many JDM tasks, they also commonly show evidence of biases in judgment and
reliance on heuristic “shortcuts” (Kahneman et al., 1982). Rather than interpret this
“heuristics and biases” literature as evidence that adults are inherently irrational, some
have suggested that rational (or “adaptive”) decision making is supported by two
separate, parallel modes of cognition -- a conscious, analytic system responsible for
logical, computational processing, and a pre-conscious, experiential system that supports
quick, intuitive, heuristic processing, and is based in implicit memory (e.g., Epstein,
1994; Klaczynski, 2001; Stanovich, 1999). In response to mounting evidence in support
of this and similar dual-process models of adult cognition, developmental JDM
researchers have argued that theories of cognitive development focused on the maturation
of logical competence have neglected a central aspect of cognition (Jacobs & Klaczynski,
2002). From this perspective, both the analytic and the experiential system mature over
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the course of development and together support the paradoxical mix of logic and bias
observed in adult JDM.
Research guided by dual-process models of cognitive development has
demonstrated age-related progressions in the use of different classes of heuristics that at
first glance appear quite paradoxical. On the one hand, studies comparing younger and
older adolescents on a variety of standard JDM tasks demonstrate growth in “normative”
(i.e., logically coherent, heuristic-resistant) reasoning from early to middle adolescence
(for a review, see Klaczynski, 2005). For instance, middle adolescents show
improvements in statistical reasoning, conditional reasoning, and covariation judgments,
and show less evidence of outcome bias and use of the “sunk cost” fallacy than early
adolescents (Klaczynski, 2001; Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004). Klaczynski (2005) has
argued that such improvements in normative reasoning are related to the maturation in
adolescence of metacognitive skills; as adolescents develop the capacity and motivation
to monitor and direct their thinking, they are more likely to resist the pull of certain
heuristics and engage analytic processing systems.
On the other hand, evidence suggests that some biases and heuristics are engaged
more frequently with age across childhood and adolescence (for reviews, see Jacobs &
Klaczynski, 2002; Reyna & Farley, 2006). In particular, studies utilizing a variety of
JDM tasks involving social content have demonstrated age-related increases in the
tendency to incorrectly apply stereotype information to reasoning problems, resulting in
more transitivity errors (e.g., Markovits & Dumas, 1999), conjunction fallacies
(Davidson, 1995), and use of the representativeness heuristic (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991).
Research on the development of the representativeness heuristic, the tendency to rely on
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salient features of a scenario rather than base rate information to inform likelihood
judgments, nicely illustrates this phenomenon. For problems involving social content
(e.g., Is the perky, outgoing girl a cheerleader or a member of the band?), adolescents
show an increased propensity to favor stereotype-based information (e.g., cheerleaders
are perky) over base rates (e.g., more girls are band members than cheerleaders) (Jacobs
& Klaczynski, 2002). In contrast, adolescents show developmental gains in the use of
base-rate information on parallel problems that do not involve social content. In sum,
adolescents are capable of engaging both analytical and heuristic processing systems
when making judgments and decisions, but in contexts that activate their increasingly
rich and salient social schemas, heuristic processing appears to gain influence over the
course of adolescent development.
Reasoned and Reactive Pathways to Risk Behavior
The last decade has also seen the advancement of a growing number of dualprocess models to describe the developmental mechanisms underlying the heightened
incidence of risk-taking behavior in adolescence, relative to adulthood (e.g., Gerrard et
al., 2008; Rivers et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008). Expanding upon the rational decision
models described in the first section of this review, these theories typically argue that age
differences in risk behavior cannot be explained by the development of analytic
competence alone, but rather result from developmental changes in the balance between
two modes of processing – one that is deliberate and reasoned, and one that is intuitive
and reactive. Although the models share a similar conceptual framework, the distinctions
between them are important enough to warrant a brief review of each.
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The “prototype-willingness” model draws directly on the dual-process distinction
between analytic and experiential cognition to argue that two different modes of
processing influence risk-relevant decision making (Gerrard et al., 2008). The first mode
– a “reasoned pathway” – is based on conscious, deliberate evaluation of the costs and
benefits of choice alternatives and results in behavioral intentions, consistent with
rational decision models like the Theory of Planned Behavior (Azjen, 1985). Given that
most adolescents claim that they do not intend to engage in risk behavior (Gerrard,
Gibbons, & Gano, 2003), and yet many clearly do take risks when presented with the
opportunity, this reasoned pathway through behavioral intentions leaves important
variance in adolescent risk taking unexplained. Prototype-willingness theory contends
that adolescents engage in unintended risk behavior via an alternative mode of
processing, a “social reaction pathway” that is grounded in experiential processing,
guided by social prototoypes (i.e., schematic images of typical risk-takers), and reflected
in individual differences in behavioral willingness to take risks if presented with the
opportunity. An impressive body of evidence suggests that, in contrast to the poor
predictive value of behavioral intentions for adolescent risk behavior, behavioral
willingness prospectively predicts adolescents’ engagement in behaviors as diverse as
smoking, drinking, substance use, unprotected sex, reckless and intoxicated driving, and
even tanning (for a review, see Gerrard et al., 2008). Recent evidence suggests that, as
adolescents approach adulthood, the power of behavioral intentions to predict behavior
grows, ultimately surpassing behavioral willingness (Pomery, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, &
Gerrard, 2009). In essence, as adolescents’ gain further experience navigating their
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social world, they begin to better understand their own behavioral tendencies and more
accurately predict (and presumably control) their future decision making.
Similar to the dual-process model of cognition proposed by Jacobs & Klaczynski
(2002), the “fuzzy-trace” model of adolescent risk taking draws upon evidence of
developmental increases in heuristic processing to argue that cognitive maturation entails
not only growth in reasoning capacity, but also the increasing application of intuition to
JDM (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Rivers et al., 2008). This developmental pattern is
exemplified by age differences in framing effects on risk taking. Whereas adults show a
differential tendency to gamble when a choice is framed in terms of a loss versus a gain
(i.e., preferring the risky option to avoid a loss, but preferring the “sure thing” to
guarantee a small gain), young children do not differentiate between gain/loss frames;
framing effects become progressively more common with age (Reyna & Ellis, 1994).
Fuzzy trace theory interprets these findings as evidence for developmental maturation of
“gist-based” processing – the adaptive tendency to rely on simple, categorical intuitions,
derived from experience, to guide JDM. In the problems described above, adult
preferences are more likely to be guided by the simple intuition that “it is better to win
some money than to win none.” In contrast, children and adolescents make choices that
reflect logically “normative” evaluation of loss and gain probabilities. Applied to realworld risk taking, this model suggests that adolescents lack the experience with negative
consequences to support mature, categorical avoidance of risky choices, and instead show
an over-reliance on conscious evaluation of the costs and benefits of risky behavior,
which often favor the risky choice. Thus, in contrast to the prototype-willingness model,
which argues that adolescents’ over-reliance on experiential processing increases their
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tendency to engage in risk behavior, fuzzy trace theory claims that adolescents’
heightened propensity toward taking risks derives from their under-reliance on intuition.
Finally, recent work from our lab (and others) has drawn on findings from
developmental neuroscience to argue that the differential maturational trajectories of two
core neurobiological systems creates a window of vulnerability for increased risk taking
in adolescence (e.g., Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Chambers, Taylor, & Potenza, 2003;
Dahl, 2004; Steinberg, 2008). We describe and review evidence for these models in the
following section, which discusses important gains in our understanding of social,
emotional, and self-regulatory influences on adolescent JDM.
Emotion, Context, and Self-Regulation
Let us return for a moment to the hypothetical teenager who introduced this
review. Headed to his first big keg party, he wasn’t exactly intending to drink, but he
knew he would have to be very careful not to get caught if he did. Based on the research
described in the first section of this review, we know that a variety of cognitive factors
will influence his decision of whether or not to drink at the party, most notably his
perceptions of the risks and benefits involved. However, a dual-process perspective
suggests that decision making is influenced by not only cognitive inputs, but also
feelings: the excitement of being with friends, the thrill of crossing parental or legal
boundaries, and the fear of getting caught are all plausible affective contributions to our
teenager’s in-the-moment decision of whether or not to drink.
Research with adult populations has identified several pathways by which affect
contributes to the decision-making process (for reviews, see Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee,
& Welch, 2001; Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). First, the anticipated
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emotional outcomes of behavioral alternatives contribute to cognitive assessments of
their expected value (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The teenager at the keg party might
imagine that joining his friends in drinking beer will lessen his social anxiety and
increase his positive emotion, whereas abstaining will make him feel excluded and
increase his anxiety. These anticipated emotional consequences contribute to his global
evaluation of the desirability of the risky choice.
Second, direct emotional responses to qualities of the choice alternatives – that is,
anticipatory emotions -- influence their evaluation, and motivate approach or avoidance
behavior (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Research grounded in inferential models of the
influence of emotion on cognition suggests that individuals adaptively consult their
feelings as a source of information when making a judgment about a given target (e.g.,
“the affect heuristic”) (Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). Returning to the
keg party, if our teenager had a prior negative experience drinking beer, he may respond
with a degree of disgust to the smell of spilled beer around the keg, and this aversive
emotion might influence his behavior either indirectly (by contributing to a negative
evaluation of the desirability of drinking) or directly (through heightened avoidance
motivation).
A third class of affective inputs has variously been referred to as incidental
emotion or background mood, and includes emotions elicited by factors not related to the
decision itself (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Dating back to Zajonc’s seminal affective
priming studies (Zajonc, 1980), research on the interplay of emotion and cognition has
demonstrated the influence of pre-existing or experimentally elicited affective states on
perception, memory, judgment, and behavior (Winkielman et al., 2007). For instance,
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individuals surveyed on a sunny day rate their life satisfaction as higher than those
contacted on a rainy day (Scwarz & Clore, 1983), and experimental elicitation of positive
or negative emotion is associated with corresponding shifts toward optimistic or
pessimistic judgments about risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Indeed, recent
experimental work suggests that emotions – whether consciously experienced or not –
may modulate an individual’s sensitivity to unrelated incentive stimuli, biasing the
individual toward approach- or avoidance-related behavior (Winkielman, Berridge, &
Wilbarger, 2005). Returning to the keg party one last time, our hypothetical teenager is
likely bombarded with socio-emotional stimuli, perhaps in the form of a crowd of
friends’ smiling faces. This positively-valenced stimulus may sensitize him to respond
appetitively to the incentive value of the cup of beer he is subsequently offered. In effect,
his immersion in a happy crowd might sensitize him to perceive the beer as more
appealing.
Given that these emotion effects have all been demonstrated in studies of adult
samples, it is important to examine their relevance for understanding the development of
adolescent decision making. However, recent research suggests that two broad patterns
in adolescent neurobehavioral development may combine to confer unique adolescent
susceptibility to socio-emotional influences on JDM (e.g., Casey et al., 2008; Chambers
et al., 2003; Dahl, 2004; Steinberg, 2008). First, around the time of puberty,
developmental changes in the dynamics of dopamine (e.g., Laviola et al., 2001) and
oxytocin (e.g., Chibbar, Toma, Mitchell, & Miller, 1990) neurotransmission are thought
to alter the sensitivity of a network of brain regions we refer to as the socio-emotional
incentive processing system. Increased sensitivity in this network, which includes
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regions involved in reward (e.g., ventral striatum) and social information (e.g., medial
prefrontal cortex) processing, may contribute to normative increases in sensation seeking
and sensitivity to socio-emotional stimuli in early adolescence (Spear, 2009).
In contrast, prolonged structural refinements over the course of adolescence and
early adulthood in regions associated with cognitive control (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal
and posterior parietal cortex) are thought to support older adolescents’ emerging capacity
to regulate their behavior (Casey et al., 2008). Although the details of these structural
refinements and their relation to behavioral improvements remain a matter of debate,
there is now extensive evidence demonstrating late adolescent changes in gray and white
matter density, as well as gains in the coherence of white matter connections within and
between cortical and subcortical regions (see Paus, 2009, for a review of the evidence).
At the functional level, adolescents show progressive gains in the efficient (i.e., focal)
recruitment of prefrontal and parietal regions that are correlated with behavioral gains in
cognitive control, including the suppression of impulsive responding (Durston et al.,
2006). In sum, to the degree that adolescents are primed to seek out and respond to
rewards, and at the same time possess immature self-regulatory skills, the influence of
socio-emotional stimuli is likely to loom large for their decision making.
Because of space limitations, we will forego a detailed review of the
neuroscientific evidence in support of this model (see Casey et al., 2008; Chambers et al.,
2003; Dahl, 2004; Steinberg, 2008), and instead focus on related developments in social,
emotional, and self-regulatory behavior in adolescence. However, we note that the
application of neuroscience to the study of adolescent JDM has been one of the most
dramatic (and fruitful) developments in the field’s last decade. Not only has
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neuroscience provided new evidence to inspire and constrain our hypotheses about
adolescent behavioral development, it has also hastened the emergence of JDM as a
nexus for research integrating cognitive, social, and affective perspectives on adolescent
development.
Developmental Trends in Reward Motivation, Affective Learning, and Sensitivity to
Peer Influence
It has long been known that self-reported sensation seeking (i.e., the motivation to
seek out novel, varied, and highly stimulating experiences) declines between adolescence
and adulthood (e.g., Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). Although Zuckerman
(1969) originated the hypothesis that sensation seeking increases from childhood to early
adolescence before beginning its decline, only recently have studies been conducted with
samples broad enough in age range to confirm this curvilinear developmental trend (e.g.,
Romer & Hennessy, 2007; Steinberg, Albert et al., 2008). Importantly, one study found
that the growth in sensation seeking observed in the transition from childhood to
adolescence was more closely related to pubertal status than age (Martin et al., 2002),
suggesting that observed age trends reflect normative biological development (rather
than, for instance, changing peer norms). This interpretation is further supported by
observations of adolescent peaks in reward seeking in studies of rodents and non-human
primates (Spear, 2009). Relating to our earlier discussion of the influence of anticipated
emotion, sensation seeking may increase adolescents’ propensity to make risky decisions
by imbuing risky options with strong reward value. Indeed, research has consistently
found a positive relation between sensation seeking and engagement in a variety of risk
behaviors (e.g., Arnett, 1992; Roberti, 2004; Zuckerman, 1994; Zuckerman & Kuhlman,
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2000), with at least one recent study reporting that this relation is mediated by the degree
to which adolescents expect that risk taking will produce positive feelings (i.e., their
anticipated affect) (Romer & Hennessy, 2007).
Studies utilizing affective learning paradigms further suggest that adolescents are
not necessarily hypersensitive to all emotional stimuli, but rather respond more strongly
to reward than punishment feedback. According to the somatic marker hypothesis,
motivational behavior is guided by subtle affective learning from prior experience with
reinforcement and/or punishment outcomes; such learning is thought to result in
anticipatory feelings that bias the individual toward approach or avoidance in future
encounters with the stimulus (Damasio, 1994). Research utilizing age-appropriate
variants of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has shown developmental gains over the
course of childhood and adolescence in the capacity to adjust behavior in response to
conflicting reward and punishment feedback (e.g., avoiding choices that result in small
immediate gains but large long-term losses) (Crone, Vendel, & Van der Molen, 2003;
Crone & Van der Molen, 2004). Furthermore, these gains appear related to gradual
maturation of the capacity to learn from punishment outcomes (Crone, Bunge, Latenstein,
Van der Molen, 2005), reflected in stronger anticipatory autonomic arousal when
confronted with a previously punished choice (Crone & Van der Molen, 2007). Finally, a
recent study that assessed a large sample of 10 to 30 year olds on a variant of the IGT that
produces separate measures of reward and punishment sensitivity found that, whereas
sensitivity to punishment matures in a linear trajectory across development, reward
sensitivity evinces a peak in adolescence before declining into adulthood, similar to the
pattern observed for sensation seeking (Cauffman et al., 2010). Findings from this same
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program of work, discussed in a later section, also indicate that adolescents may be
especially drawn to immediate rewards (Steinberg, Graham, et al., 2009). In sum,
evidence is beginning to accumulate suggesting that adolescents are not only overly
sensitive to rewards, but also relatively deficient in anticipating and learning from
punishment.
Given this evidence for heightened sensation seeking and reward sensitivity, it is
perhaps not that surprising that adolescents also demonstrate an exaggerated
susceptibility to peer influences on risk-relevant decision making (Albert & Steinberg, in
press). What could be more fun and rewarding than joining one’s friends in exploring
uncharted territory? Research has long indicated that adolescents are more likely than
adults to take risks in the context of peer groups (rather than alone), and one of the bestdocumented predictors of adolescents’ risky behavior is the behavior of their peers, a
finding that has been attributed to a combination of social learning processes, opportunity
effects, and the tendency for risk-takers to seek out similar friends (Prinstein & Dodge,
2008). One recent study suggests that the mere presence of peers differentially biases
adolescents toward increased risk-taking behavior (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). In this
study, adolescents (mean age = 14), youths (mean age = 19), and adults (mean age = 37)
were tested on a computer driving task that mimicked the real-life decision of whether to
run a series of yellow lights and risk being hit by an unseen car. Peer context was
manipulated by randomly assigning each group of three participants to play the game
either individually (alone in the room), or with two same-aged peers in the room. When
tested alone, the three age groups engaged in a comparable amount of risk taking. In
contrast, adolescents took twice as many risks when tested with their peers in the room
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(relative to the alone condition), whereas the college-aged group was approximately 50%
riskier, and adults showed no differences in risky driving related to context.
Taken together, these developmental patterns are beginning to provide a plausible
account of why adolescents sometimes demonstrate poor judgment and decision making
in the real world, despite a mature capacity to understand and reason about the costs and
benefits of their choices. Consistent with recent functional neuroimaging work
demonstrating adolescent peaks in sensitivity to reward (e.g., Galvan et al., 2006) and
social (e.g., Blakemore, 2008) stimuli, the behavioral research described above suggests
that adolescents – more so than adults – are motivated to seek out novel and exciting
experiences, more capable of learning from the positive than the negative consequences
of those experiences, and more likely to take risks when in the presence of their peers. It
is thus no great surprise that adolescents tend to make riskier decisions that adults,
especially in peer contexts. This brings us to our final question: What developmental
mechanisms might account for the normative decline in risky decision making observed
across the transition from adolescence to adulthood?
The Development of Self-Regulatory Competence
In contrast to the relatively sudden changes in social, emotional, and reward
processing that occur around the time of puberty, cognitive capacities supporting mature
self-regulation appear to develop in a gradual, linear pattern over the course of
adolescence, frequently extending into early adulthood (Steinberg, 2008). A growing
body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that these improvements in
cognitive control are supported by structural and functional maturation of a
phylogenetically recent brain system that includes the lateral PFC, parietal association
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cortices, and parts of the anterior cingulate cortex, as well as enhanced connectivity
between this system and subcortical areas (for a review, see Casey et al., 2008).
Whereas adolescents demonstrate adult-like competence in logical reasoning and
information processing by about age 15 or 16, developmental improvements in higherorder executive functions known to simultaneously recruit multiple sub-regions of the
PFC are evident across the course of adolescence and into early adulthood. For instance,
improved performance is evident in late adolescence on tasks assessing response
inhibition (e.g., Luna et al., 2001), strategic problem solving (e.g., Luciana, Collins,
Olson, & Schissel, 2009), and flexible rule use (e.g., Crone, Somsen, Zonlie, & Van der
Molen, 2006). Furthermore, these age-related gains in executive function are reflected in
a growing body of developmental neuroimaging research, which has generally
demonstrated adolescent improvements in the efficient recruitment of task-relevant brain
regions (e.g., dorsolateral PFC) supporting mature cognitive control (e.g., Durston et al.,
2006).
Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, improved coordination of
cognitive and affective processes is also evident in late adolescence and early adulthood
(Steinberg, 2008). Broadly speaking, as adolescents mature, they appear increasingly
capable of regulating the social and emotional influences that previously biased their
judgment and decision making toward risky behavior. For instance, self-report and
behavioral evidence indicate a pattern of linear growth in impulse control extending
through adolescence and into the twenties (e.g., Galvan et al., 2007; Leshem &
Glicksohn, 2007; Steinberg, Albert, et al., 2008). Moreover, research utilizing temporal
discounting paradigms demonstrates steady declines across adolescence in the tendency
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to choose small immediate rewards, rather than larger delayed rewards, reflecting the
capacity or willingness to delay gratification in support of long-term goals (e.g., Olson,
Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 2007; Steinberg, Graham, et al., 2009). This pattern of
gradual, prolonged maturation of self-regulatory capacity is further supported by
evidence of late adolescent gains in future orientation (e.g. Steinberg, Graham, et al.,
2009), planning (e.g., Albert, Steinberg, & Banich, under review; Luciana, Collins,
Olson, & Schissel, 2009), and metacognition (for a review, see Klaczynski, 2005).
Finally, recent self-report evidence showing continued gains through at least age 18 in the
ability to resist peer influence suggests that this emerging capacity for self-regulation
extends to adolescents’ social worlds (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007); moreover, recent
neuroimaging research indicates that individual differences in resistance to peer pressure
are correlated with relatively more mature patterns of white matter organization (Paus,
Toro et al., 2008). In sum, one compelling explanation for why adults tend to make more
adaptive decisions than adolescents is that they have a more mature capacity to resist the
pull of social and emotional influences and remain focused on long-term goals.
Concluding Comments and Future Directions
As exemplified by the research and theory reviewed in this article, the last decade
has witnessed a kind of redefinition of what it means to study judgment and decision
making in adolescence. Moving beyond a relatively narrow focus on age differences in
the rational processing of decision elements, the field has begun to grapple with the
dynamic quality of adolescents’ subjective decision-making experience – their beliefs and
values, intentions and intuitions, emotions and self-awareness, all developing in the midst
of a changing social world. We conclude our review by suggesting four lines of research
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that are needed to bolster this integrative progress, and ultimately to inform better
interventions and policies charged with supporting adolescents’ well being.
First, although research examining the cognitive predictors of adolescent healthrisk behavior made important strides in the last decade – notably, by moving beyond a
narrow focus on perceptions of risk and vulnerability, toward a broader view of the
concerns that adolescents’ themselves find salient – further longitudinal research is
crucial for disentangling the reciprocal influence of perception and experience. We are
certainly not the first to suggest this (see Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002), but given
the implications for the effectiveness of health risk messages, the importance of
understanding this perception-experience relation cannot be overstated. If adolescents
develop inflated perceptions of risk based on the efforts of well-meaning health
educators, but these perceptions are inherently unstable and subject to radical discounting
in response to unpunished experience (i.e., the most probable outcome), then we are
doing them a disservice by not honestly discussing the realistic costs and benefits of risk
behavior. In addition to longitudinal studies better capable of modeling perceptionexperience interactions, experimental studies are needed that can examine the degree to
which adolescents adjust their “instructed” risk perceptions in response to direct or
vicarious experience with unpunished risk behavior.
Second, much of the credit for the field’s increasingly integrative focus is due to
the theoretical expansion provided by the dual-process models described in the second
section of this review. Recognizing that adolescent judgment and decision making is
notably inconsistent with their capacities and reported intentions, these theories proposed
that something else must be at work. Taken together, this something else looks “hot”,
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reactive, intuitive, experiential, not necessarily conscious, and often based on social
stereotypes or prototypes. By opening the door to these domains of thinking and feeling,
the field has greatly enhanced its explanatory power. We caution, however, that these
dual-process explanations are themselves likely to represent heuristics of a sort; multiple
separable processes contribute to adolescent JDM, and while conceptually useful, dualprocess theories must remain flexible enough to avoid false dualities and rather attempt to
model this complexity. This cautionary note aside, several of these theories converge in
identifying particularly influential “hot” contributions to decision making. Research on
social heuristics and social prototypes highlight the increasing importance of “social
meanings” for guiding behavior in adolescence (Sunstein, 2008). Attention should
continue to be given to the pathways by which these social meanings influence
adolescent JDM and, in particular, the environmental factors (e.g., media, peers, parents,
school) that shape the social meaning of risk behavior. Moreover, evidence that
adolescents are slow to develop “gist-based" avoidance of risk, despite exposure to
countless risk-avoidant messages, again raises interesting questions regarding the most
effective way to present health-promoting information. If adolescents are differentially
sensitive to the reward potential of their decisions – as suggested by developmental
trends in sensation seeking and reward learning, as well as the influence of perceived
benefits in predicting risk behavior – prevention research might gain more traction by
working to strengthen adolescents’ intuitive appreciation of the benefits of healthpromoting behaviors (and challenge their intuitions about the benefits of risk taking).
Third, the field’s enthusiasm (including our own) for the emerging work on the
social neuroscience of adolescent JDM must be tempered by two observations. First,
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during the past decade research on the neural underpinnings of JDM in adolescence has
far outpaced research on the very behaviors that the neuroscience is intended to inform.
Indeed, as we note elsewhere (Steinberg, 2010), some of the best behavioral research on
adolescents’ reward seeking and self-regulation conducted in the past 10 years comes
from functional imaging research on these phenomena. Neuroimaging studies of JDM,
while useful, need to be complemented by experimental and nonexperimental research on
adolescent JDM in the real world. Much of the literature on novelty-seeking and selfregulation outside the scanner is now very old.
Finally, as illustrated by the Gardner and Steinberg (2005) study of peer
influences on risk taking cited previously, the social context in which adolescent JDM is
assessed may have a profound influence on the conclusions one draws regarding age
differences in decision making; studies of individuals making decisions on their own
likely minimize differences between adolescents and adults. More research that takes the
social context of JDM into account would be especially informative. Along similar lines,
it is likely that age differences in JDM are accentuated under conditions of emotional
arousal, just as they are when individuals are socially aroused. For example, a recent
study that used a relatively simple experimental manipulation to increase the affective
arousal of a decision-making task demonstrated substantially larger age differences in
risk taking than were seen on an otherwise-identical low-arousal task (Figner, Mackinlay,
Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). The social psychology literature is replete with examples of
research on ways in which affective and social factors moderate JDM, but this work has,
by and large, been adevelopmental, involving samples of college undergraduates.
Developmentally-informed work in this vein is sorely needed.
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As we have detailed in this review, research on JDM during adolescence took
several new directions during the past decade, moving away from studies that focus
purely on rational processing and toward research that adds psychosocial factors into the
mix and that attempts to link behavioral research with emergent models of adolescent
brain development. By bridging work on biological, cognitive, emotional, and social
development in adolescence, we will gain a deeper and richer understanding of the
processes that influence judgment and decision making at keg parties and in the other
real-world contexts in which adolescents spend time.
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